Arbitration, Employment: Ninth Circuit Rules That Employer Violates National Labor Relations Act By Requiring Employees To Agree Not To Bring “A Concerted Legal Claim” Involving Wages, Hours, And Terms Of Employment
Judge Ikuta Dissents: “This decision is breathtaking in its scope and in its error . . . “
The issue decided in Morris v. Ernst & Young, No. 13-16599 (9th Cir. 8/22/16) is clearly framed by the majority and dissenting opinions, and almost certainly headed for Supreme Court review. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Judge Thomas, the panel holds an employer violates sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA by requiring employees to sign an agreement precluding them from bringing, in any forum, a concerted legal claim regarding wages, hours, and terms of conditions of employment.
Judge Thomas identifies “a core right to concerted activity” established by the NLRA. “Irrespective of the forum in which disputes are resolved, employees must be able to act in the forum together. The structure of the Ernst & Young contract prevents that.”
The majority opinion relies on Chevron deference to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA, on the statutory reference in section 7 of the NLRA to the right of employees “to engage in other concerted activities”, on the savings clause in the FAA that permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses (but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration), and on a distinction between substantive rights and procedural rights. This last distinction is particularly important, because the majority describes the right to concerted action as a substantive right that cannot be eliminated in arbitration agreements or in other agreements.
The majority nimbly distinguishes the Italian Colors case. Readers of my blog will recall that Justice Kagan, dissenting in Italian Colors, lamented that the majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, gave the plaintiffs a right to sue without an effective remedy, because they could not sue as a class. “Too darn bad” was her nutshell of the case. [See June 25, 2013 post.] In Morris, Judge Thomas distinguishes Italian Colors as a case in which a procedural, not a substantive right, was waived, because the antitrust statutory scheme at issue in Italian Colors did not create a right to concerted activity, only a right to sue for antitrust violations. By way of contrast, Judge Thomas views the extinction of employees’ right to concerted activity as the loss of a substantive right created by federal statute.
Judge Thomas explains that the panel’s holding does not uniquely burden arbitration:
“The contract here would face the same NLRA troubles if Ernst & Young required its employees to use only courts, or only rolls of the dice or tarot cards, to resolve workplace disputes – so long as the exclusive forum provision is coupled with a restriction on concerted activity in that forum. At its heart, this is a labor case, not an arbitration case.”
Judge Ikuta vigorously dissents, arguing that the FAA preempts federal court here from not enforcing the arbitration agreement, and that the panel’s holding is counter to recent Supreme Court case law, as well as case law of the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, concluding that “the NLRA does not invalidate collective action waivers in arbitration agreements.”
Political Footnote. Judge Ikuta, who clerked for Judge Kozinski and Justice O’Connor, was nominated for the Ninth Circuit by President George W. Bush. Judge Thomas was nominated by President Bill Clinton for a seat on the Ninth Circuit. Judge Hurwitz was nominated by President Barack Obama.
Arbitration, Enforceability, Existence Of Agreement, Employment: Orders Denying Motions To Compel Arbitration And Staying Arbitration Survive Appeals In Fourth, Sixth, And Fifth Districts
The next three cases show that, notwithstanding the trend to uphold agreements to arbitrate, there are still plenty of situations in which our California Courts of Appeal will agree that arbitration should be denied or stayed, and allow litigation to go forward.
Tran v. Integra LifeSciences Corporation, No. G051620 (4th Dist. Div. 3 8/18/16) (unpublished): Order Denying Motion To Compel Arbitration Affirmed.
In Tran, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration provision was superseded by a different, later arbitration provision, and the later provision was unconscionable. The operative arbitration provision was “take it or leave it” and unconscionable because it required Tran, a California employee, to arbitrate her claims in New Jersey, and because the arbitration provision had various provisions reflecting the unilateral nature of the arbitration requirement. Justice Thompson authored the decision. Affirmed.
Scheiber v. Shoe Palace Corporation, No. H041495 (Sixth Dist. 8/16/16) (unpublished): Appeal Of Order Staying Arbitration Of Plaintiff’s Individual Claims And Allow PAGA Claim To Proceed In Court Declared Moot.
Defendant’s appeal was limited to challenging the trial court’s decision to stay the arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims, and did not challenge order that representative claims could be litigated in court. However, because the plaintiff sought dismissal of his individual claims in the trial court, and represented in the Court of Appeal that he would dismiss those claims before they were ever arbitrated, the appeal was dismissed as moot. Justice Bamattre-Manoukian authored the decision.
Ashbury Heights Capital, LLC v. FactSet Research Systems Inc., No. A145806 (1st Dist. Div. 1 8/16/16) (unpublished): Order Denying Motion To Compel Arbitration Is Affirmed.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, because plaintiff’s claims pertained only to defendants’ conduct in the years after the contract was terminated. Affirmed.
One interesting question here is why the court, rather than the arbitrator, decided the issue. After all, the Commercial Arbitration rules of the AAA entitled the arbitrator to decide disputes over the scope of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal, however, viewed the issue as turning “on the continued validity of the arbitration clause, not the clause’s scope.” So essentially the Court viewed the validity issue as a gateway issue that the Court should decide. Justice Margulies authored the decision.
Arbitration, Jurisdiction: State Trial Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Vacate Interim Award That Is Not An Arbitration Award
The Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act Diverge On Whether Interim Arbitration Awards Can Be Vacated.
In the aptonymically-named case, Judge v. Superior Court, No. B267694 (2/7 8/15/16) (unpublished), the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge had property vacated an arbitrator’s ruling on clause construction requiring class arbitration of plaintiff’s Labor Code Claims.
Justice Segal, authoring the Court’s opinion, explains that while an arbitration award may be vacated, an award that does not “include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy,” as required by Code of Civ. Proc., section 1283.4, is not an award. Because the clause construction award at issue in Judge did not qualify as an award, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate it.
Believing that the trial judge had made it clear that she had made up her mind that she would vacate any class-based arbitral award, “in the interests of justice,” the Court of Appeal directed that a different trial judge hear further proceedings in the matter.
The case was apparently governed by the FAA, and as we know, the FAA can preempt state law. Interestingly, the law concerning vacation of awards differs under the FAA and under the California Arbitration Act, and even more interestingly the FAA procedure did not apply here. Footnote 7 of the decision assembles federal cases allowing petitions to vacate interim arbitration awards under Section 10 of the FAA (9 U.S.C., section 10). However, the California Supreme Court has stated that “’the United States Supreme Court does not read the FAA’s provisions to apply to state court proceedings.’ . . . As we have noted, the provisions for judicial review of arbitration awards in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are directed to ‘the United States court in and for the district where the award was made.’” Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 (2008).
Arbitration, Estoppel, Waiver: Failure To Timely Exercise Right To Baseball Arbitration Is “The Whole Ball Game”
Court Of Appeal Rejects Waiver, Estoppel And Forfeiture Arguments Made By Lessor Who Failed To Timely Exercise Right To “Baseball Arbitration” In Rental Dispute.
Miss Myrtle Rowe holding a baseball bat. March 14, 2010. Library of Congress.
“Baseball arbitration” takes its name from salary arbitration in Major League Baseball, in which the arbitrator must choose which of two positions is the more reasonable position. Baseball arbitration is sometimes employed in lease disputes, as it was in Zawtocki v. Black Angus Steakhouses, LLC, No. E062969 (4/2 8/11/16) (Ramirez, Hollenhorst, Miller) (unpublished).
Zawtocki leased to Black Angus Steakhouse. The lessee exercised an offer to extend the lease, the lessor offered to do so for $220,000/year, and the lessee countered with $140,000.
However, instead of timely exercising a right to require baseball arbitration under the lease, the lessor went sideways by failing to make a timely demand. As a consequence, the trial court denied the lessor’s petition to compel arbitration. The lessor appealed, contending, among other things, that he was entitled to relief from forfeiture, and that the forfeiture should be excused by waiver or estoppel.
The Court of Appeal rejected waiver, estoppel, and forfeiture arguments, analogizing the failure to timely exercise the right to arbitrate to a failure to timely exercise an option – something that is not a forfeiture. Affirmed.
Presumably the lessor is now stuck with the $140,000 rental amount. Or, as the Court of Appeal put it: “The arbitration petition is, so to speak, the whole ball game.”
Arbitration, Class Actions: Uber And Out?–Class Settlement Of Claims Against Uber Is Rejected By District Court, Leaving Uber Drivers Potentially Exposed To Individual Arbitration Depending On 9th Circuit’s Inclinations
Enforceability Of Arbitration Provisions Is Uncertain, Threatening To Upset The Settlement Applecart.
Joel Rosenblatt, reporting for Bloomberg on August 18, 2016, explains why San Francisco District Court Judge Edward Chen’s rejection of a class-settlement between Uber and its drivers may now give Uber the upper hand: the Ninth Circuit is poised to rule on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in Uber driver contracts in another case, and if it enforces the arbitration clauses, Uber could force drivers to individually arbitrate their claims, eviscerating the class action.
Judge Chen, who rejected the $100M settlement as being not generous enough to the Uber drivers, had previously ruled that Uber’s arbitration clauses could not be enforced. However, the Ninth Circuit could overturn his ruling that the arbitration clauses are invalid in another pending case involving Uber drivers. It would be an odd twist of fate if the Judge’s ruling results in a worse outcome for the drivers.
The case brings together some great legal talent that includes Shannon Liss-Riordan for the drivers, and Ted Boutrous for Uber.
Stay tuned.
Mediation, Attorney’s Fees: Fee-Shifting Provision In Davis-Stirling Act Applies To HOA Action To Enforce Settlement Agreement With Homeowner Arising Out Of Mediation Conducted Pursuant To Mandatory ADR Requirements Of The Act
Policy Of Encouraging Parties To Resolve Disputes Without Resort To Litigation Supports Liberal Construction Of Statutory Language.
“This case presents the question of whether the Davis-Stirling Act, and particularly the fee-shifting provision of section 5975, subdivision (c), applies to an action to enforce a settlement agreement arising out of a mediation conducted pursuant to the mandatory alternative dispute resolution requirements of the Act.” Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association v. Hazelbaker, et al., No. E063272 (4/2 8/9/16) (Hollenhorst, Ramirez, Miller).
Section 5795, the fee-shifting provision, applies to litigation “to enforce the governing documents.” So is an HOA lawsuit to enforce an agreement that was reached during mediation, is an action “to enforce the governing documents” of the HOA? Yes, says the Court of Appeal, on the facts here.
The pre-litigation ADR scheme applying to HOA disputes is intended to encourage the parties to an HOA dispute to settle their dispute through ADR rather than through litigation. The Court reasoned that the policy would be thwarted if an “action to enforce the governing documents” was narrowly construed, because then a party could settle an HOA dispute through mediation, not fulfill its settlement obligations, and avoid cost-shifting entirely. Besides, the gravamen of the HOA’s original complaint here was that the defendants had not taken the steps necessary to bring their property into compliance with the HOA’s CC&Rs.
COMMENT: The HOA dispute originally arose over unapproved changes to a patio area. The prevailing party here, the HOA, sought $31,970 in attorney’s fees, and the trial court awarded only $18,991 in attorney’s fees. Now the Court of Appeal has awarded the HOA its additional costs and attorney’s fees on appeal . Kinda argues in favor of the mediation process, and carrying out settlement obligations after an agreement has been reached.