Mediation Confidentiality Statutes: An Experienced Mediator Comments On The California Law Revision Commission’s Proposal To Create An Exception To Mediation Confidentiality
Mediator Jill Switzer Comments On The Recent Proposal Before The California Law Revision Commission To Loosen Mediation Confidentiality Statutes.
On August 30, 2015, I posted that on August 7, 2015, the California Law Revision Commission directed staff “to begin the process of preparing a draft of a tentative recommendation that would propose an exception to the mediation confidentiality statutes (Evid. Code sections 1115-1128) to address ‘attorney malpractice and other misconduct.’”
Jill Switzer, an experienced mediator who has been a member of the State Bar for nearly 40 years, has communicated her thoughts to the California Law Revision Commission about the recent proposal. She has graciously given me permission to publish her probing comments on my blog. Her comments reflect her personal views, and are not the views of any organization, committee, or business with which she may be affiliated. I welcome any comments that my readers have about this topic. Here are Jill Switzer’s comments:
1. The general concept is to propose an exception to the mediation confidentiality statutes that would address “attorney malpractice and other misconduct.” What other misconduct does this contemplate? What would that be? Since the attorney mediator is not acting as a lawyer for purposes of conducting the mediation, .e.g not giving legal advice, there’s no attorney-client relationship, what would the Commission see as misconduct by the attorney mediator?
2. The exception should apply “…regardless of whether the alleged misconduct occurred during a mediation.” So, does this mean that it would apply to the convening stage, any/all pre and or post mediation communications, telephone calls, etc.? How would that even arise, especially since the clients are not involved in the convening, the pre/post mediation communications that the lawyers and mediators may have?
3. I carry mediator malpractice insurance (in an abundance of caution), which, right now, is very reasonable because mediators don’t get sued. That will certainly change. Rates will go up and if mediators are indeed brought into litigation as defendants or cross-defendants, the rates may well skyrocket. So, I will have to raise my rates to cover the increased insurance costs. Great, try explaining that to parties and counsel who think my rates are too high as they are.
4. What if I have insurance and the defendant lawyer doesn’t? On the deep pocket theory, plaintiff’s counsel will either sue me at the outset, or the defendant will cross-complain against me for indemnity. I thus become the “deep pocket.” Will I need to ask the counsel participating in the mediation whether he/she carries insurance? Should I ask for a certificate of insurance to satisfy that inquiry? Since malpractice insurance is on a “claims made” basis, what if the attorney has insurance at the time of the mediation, but does not have it at the time the claim is made? What if my carrier decides to settle based on nuisance value, etc., costs of defense, etc? I have a deductible I have to pay, regardless of whether I’m in for a penny or in for a pound in the litigation.
Putting the mediator in the mix is going to prompt some mediators, such as me, to start looking for something else to do. I’m not going to go bare, but I’m also not going to be the “fall gal” for an attorney’s alleged malpractice. I refuse to be a guarantor.
5. Even if I know nothing, I wasn’t in any caucuses where counsel and client were discussing the pros and cons of resolution, which is where the claimed malpractice occurred, I’m going to get dragged in. I am going to have to prove a negative. No plaintiff’s counsel is necessarily going to take my word that I wasn’t present without my being deposed. Unless and until the plaintiff’s counsel then decides that there’s “no there there,” and defense counsel sees that there is no basis for a cross-complaint against me, I’m stuck.
6. Whose job will it be to advise the clients that there’s no mediation confidentiality? Shouldn’t that be the attorneys’ job? If they don’t advise in advance of the mediation, does it then become my job to advise the clients in the mediation that there’s no confidentiality? Do I demand proof from the attorneys that they have so advised? How many cases would settle without mediation confidentiality?
7. After the mediation, unless I’m continuing my efforts to resolve the matter, I shred all notes, briefs, and/or any correspondence post-mediation. If there’s now the possibility of being sued, how long do I have to keep those? Do I have to keep them at least one year post legal malpractice possibility? When does that statute start running? If I don’t, am I liable for spoliation? How do I determine whether I think the resolution (or non-resolution as the case may be) may lead to a malpractice claim and thus require document retention?
8. This proposal is only going to increase litigation and its attendant costs, which is what mediation is supposed to alleviate. Mediation is a voluntary process, so the parties can leave at any time, and I’ve had that happen. Mediation is supposed to be a way to resolve disputes in an efficient, cost-effective manner. Why is there the assumption that the client got hosed by its lawyer in mediation and was forced to settle? There are going to be many cases of "settlor’s remorse,” clients who think that they can leverage a better deal by suing for malpractice.
9. If we lose mediation confidentiality, then there’s no point to mediating. Just have everything handled as an early settlement conference, MSC, or ENE by a judicial officer and ditch mediation altogether. Given the sorry financial state of the courts these days, I’m sure that they’ll be delighted to have even more work than they already have.
This proposal takes the sledgehammer to the gnat approach. If the clients don’t want to be bound by confidentiality and thus retain the option of a potential legal malpractice claim, then they shouldn’t mediate, but please don’t eviscerate what works for a great many to satisfy just a few.
Waiver: Fourth District, Div. 3 Agrees That Petition To Arbitrate “In The Middle Of Trial” Comes Too Late
Party Wishing To Enforce Right To Have Settlement Agreement Interpreted By Arbitrator Ought To Have Sought Enforcement Before Same Issues Were Submitted To Court For Adjudication On The Merits.
The underlying dispute in Kurtin v. Elieff, G049556 (4/3 Sept. 2, 2015) (Rylaarsdam, Aronson, Fybel) (unpublished) was a messy partnership buyout and accounting. After a bifurcated trial, grant of a partial new trial, appeal, and remand, Elieff petitioned for arbitration, “seeking the arbitrator’s ‘interpretation or clarification’ of aspects of the settlement agreement, prior to the partial retrial.” The trial court denied the petition, concluding the right to arbitrate had been waived, a ruling now affirmed on appeal: “Elieff has, in effect, petitioned for arbitration in the middle of trial. Such a petition is untimely as a matter of law.”
The arbitration clause was unusual, because it expressly gave the arbitrator – the famed Tony Piazza — the power to add or rewrite provisions in the parties’ settlement agreement if needed to save the contract from unenforceability. However, the unusual nature of the arbitration agreement did not mean that the right to arbitrate could not be waived by deeply engaging in litigation. Furthermore, the issue invoked by the petition to arbitrate was the power to interpret the agreement, not the arbitrator’s ability to amend it – and interpretive issues had already been presented to the trial court.
“Given the undisputed evidence that Elieff waited until after this case was tried, a judgment was entered, an appeal was decided and the case was remanded for a partial retrial before filing his petition,” wrote the Court, “we have no trouble concluding there was no error.”
NOTE: On June 28, 2012, I posted about an earlier phase of the Kurtin/Elieff dispute. This is a long-running dispute. Kurtin filed suit against Elieff in 2007, in connection with Elieff’s performance under an earlier settlement agreement.
Department Of Corrections: Say Whaaat? SingerLewak v. Gantman, Certified For Publication Yesterday Morning, No Longer Certified By Yesterday Afternoon
Court of Appeal’s Jurisdiction To Authorize Publication Expired.
Just yesterday, in the preceding post, I reported the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8, had authorized publication of SingerLewak v. Gantman, a case offering an excellent discussion of the so-called “public policy exception” that, when it is found it exist, allows for judicial review of an arbitral award.
By the end of the day, however, the following case docket entry appeared:
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1), the court’s opinion became final on August 28, 2015. The court’s order filed August 31, 2015, granting certification to publish the opinion is hereby vacated as improvidently issued. Forthwith, the court will comply with the provisions of California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(b) regarding publication of the opinion upon order of the Supreme Court.
As Arte Johnson would say, “Very interesting . . . but not very funny.”
Rule 8.1120(b) provides: “If the rendering court does not or cannot grant the request before the decision is final in that court, it must forward the request to the Supreme Court with a copy of its opinion, its recommendation for disposition, and a brief statement of its reasons. The rendering court must forward these materials within 15 days after the decision is final in that court.”
I’ll let you know what happens.
Arbitration/Public Policy: The Opinion In SingerLewak, LLP v. Gantman is Ordered Published
An Arbitrator Implying A Geographic Limitation Under Bus. & Prof. Code Section 16602 Did Not Violate An Important Public Policy, And Thus Did Not Expose The Arbitral Award To Judicial Review.
On July 31, 2015, I posted about SingerLewak, LLP v. Gantman, B259722 (2/8 July 29, 2015; pub. Aug. 31), a case providing a detailed discussion of the “public policy exception” that can sometimes justify judicial review of an arbitral award, though not in that specific case. On August 31, 2015, the Second District, Division 8, ordered that the case should be published.
NOTE: My colleagues Ted Bacon, Mike Hensley, and Matt Hansen represented the successful plaintiff/appellant. I wrote a letter to the Court of Appeal in support of publication.
Mediation Confidentiality: California Law Revision Commission Considers Relationship Between Mediation, Confidentiality, Attorney Malpractice, And Other Misconduct
Proposed New Exception To Mediation Confidentiality Statutes Would Utilize In Camera Screening Process.
On August 7, 2015, the California Law Revision Commission directed staff “to begin the process of preparing a draft of a tentative recommendation that would propose an exception to the mediation confidentiality statutes (Evid. Code sections 1115-1128) to address ‘attorney malpractice and other misconduct.’” For minutes of the meeting, follow the link. The excerpt of the minutes concerning this topic is found at pages 4 to 6.
COMMENT: I blogged on April 8, 2012, about legislative efforts to “fix” the mediation confidentiality statutes to allow the introduction of evidence from a mediation in cases involving attorney malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.
Arbitration, Burden of Proof, Unconscionability: Superior Court’s Incorrect Allocation Of Burden Of Proof To Prove Lawsuit Is Encompassed By Arbitration Results In Reversal
Party Seeking Arbitration Only Has Initial Burden Of Establishing Prima Facie Case Of Existence Of Arbitration Agreement.
In a dispute concerning student debt, plaintiff student argued defendant loan servicer failed to establish the dispute was encompassed by the arbitration agreement. Reversed: “In denying defendant’s petition to compel arbitration, the trial court improperly required defendant to prove that plaintiff’s lawsuit is encompassed by the arbitration clauses.” Rodriguez v. Navient Solutions, Inc., B258981 (2/2 Aug. 24, 2015) (Boren, Ashmann-Gerst, Hoffstadt) (unpublished). The burden of the party petitioning for arbitration is only to offer prima facie evidence of the written agreement, after which the burden shifts to opposing party to prove a defense to enforcement or that the agreement can’t be interpreted to cover the claims. Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 (1996).
The Court of Appeal also addressed the issue of unconscionability. Perhaps the most important factor supporting the conclusion that the arbitration provision was not unconscionable was that plaintiff had 60 days to decline arbitration after the date of the first loan disbursement.
COMMENT: On May 27, 2013, I posted about unpublished cases addressing the burden of proof of a party seeking to compel arbitration. While it seems clear that the party seeking arbitration only has the burden of making a prima facie showing of the existence of the existence of an arbitration agreement, more abstruse issues may arise, such as whether that places the burden of authenticating the arbitration agreement on the moving party.
Regarding the Court’s conclusion plaintiff student “had ample time to review the arbitration clause over the course of 60 days, and confer with a lawyer about whether he should reject it or agree to it,” one can only wonder if a real live student has ever been known to do that. Still, the message is clear: an opt-out provision is a powerful tool for strengthening an arbitration provision.