Football Player Bruce Matthews Did Not Allege Sufficient Contacts With California To Show Workers’ Comp Claim Came Within Scope of California’s Workers’ Comp Regime

     Bruce Matthews, a former American college and professional football player, was an offensive lineman in the NFL for 19 seasons.  He played college football for  USC, was an All-American, and played professionally for the Oilers/Titan Franchise, retiring in 2002.  In 2008, Matthews filed a workers’ compensation claim in California related to injuries incurred during his career as a professional football player.  After Matthews filed his claim, the Titans and the NFL Management Council filed a grievance against Matthews, arguing he breached his employment agreement when he applied for benefits in California, because the agreement provided all workers’ compensation claims would be decided under Tennessee law.  Because the NFL collective bargaining agreement contained a binding arbitration clause, the parties arbitrated their dispute. 

     The arbitrator found the choice of law clause in the agreement constituted a promise to resolve workers compensation claims under Tennessee law, and Matthews violated the agreement by pursuing workers’ compensation claims in California.  Therefore, the arbitrator ordered Matthews to “cease and desist” from seeking California benefits.  Matthews filed suit in federal district court to vacate the arbitration award.  The district court denied Matthews’ motion, and confirmed the award.  Matthews appealed.  Matthews v. National Football League Management Council; Tennessee Titans, Case No. 11-55186 (9th Cir. August 6, 2012) (Fisher, J., author).

     The standard of review is a narrow one here:  “Arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld so long as they represent a plausible interpretation of the contract.”  Furthermore, to vacate an award on public policy grounds, “we must ‘(1) find that an explicit, well defined and dominant policy exists . . . and (2) that the policy is one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.’” (Matthews, citing United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1995)).  Because the facts did not appear to be in dispute, the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the district court’s resolution of legal questions.

     The Court of Appeals noted that one narrow exception to the rule that arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld “is when the arbitration award is contrary to public policy.”  However, even if the California Labor Code can be interpreted to bar an employer from using a contractual choice of law clause to prevent an employee from receiving workers’ compensation benefits under California law, Matthews had failed to allege sufficient contacts with California to bring his claims under California law.  Thus, “[h]e did not allege any specific injury in California or a need for medical services in California.”

     Mathews also argued that the arbitration award violated federal labor policy providing that an employee may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bargain away state minimum labor standards.  Same problem:  “it is not clear that Matthews’ workers’ compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime.”

     Finally, Matthews argued that the arbitrator’s award showed “manifest disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.”  Hardly manifest, concluded the Court of Appeals, because California’s interest “is highly attenuated in this case.”

     One may ask why there is no express discussion of FAA preemption of a California rule that would bar contractual waiver of workers’ compensation benefits.  This is our explanation:

      First, it was unnecessary to consider preemption, because the Court of Appeals concluded that Matthews’ contacts with California were too attenuated to give him the protection of California law.  Thus, anything that the Court of Appeals would have said about federal preemption of California law would have been dictum. 

     Second, there is no preemption of state law by federal law when federal law itself provides that there is an exception to preemption.  Here, the Court of Appeals restated Matthews’ argument that federal labor policy “provides that an employee may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bargain away state minimum labor standards.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755-56 (1985).”  In other words, if this is the law, then federal labor law provides an exception to preemption by carving out agreements that bargain away state minimum labor standards. In another case, where the employee establishes contacts to California, the Court of Appeals has left itself room to reach a different conclusion, i.e., that the employee is protected by the California Labor Code and by California public policy, from waiving a right to assert California workers’ compensation claims through an arbitration clause applying Tennessee law.  However, by concluding that Matthews had failed to establish the contacts with California necessary to stake a claim under California law, the Court of Appeals did not need to delve into the effect of federal labor policy, as such a discussion was unnecessary to reach its conclusion. 

    The district court’s judgment was affirmed.