Partial Final Award Here Was Not A Final Award.

         When I read, "[a]fter a rather convoluted multi-year path, the parties agreed to arbitration in lieu of the superior court litigation," I had a queasy feeling that the parties are not at the end of that path.  Nor were my expectations disappointed in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (Prime Health Care LA Palma, LLC, et al. Real Parties In Interest), B272284 (2/7  7/31/17) (Small¹, Perluss, Zelon).

        The underlying dispute concerned claims by Prime Healthcare La Palma LLC that Kaiser had failed to reimburse Prime for emergency medical services it provided to Kaiser members.  In the arbitration, Kaiser moved to dismiss Prime's claims on the ground they were preempted by the Medicare Act and subject to administrative exhaustion requirements that had not been satisfied.  The arbitration panel issued a partial final award denying Kaiser's motion, and the superior court entered a judgment confirming the award.

        Kaiser appealed from the judgment, contending the panel's ruling on Medicare Act preemption and exhaustion issues was wrong as a matter of law. 

        However, the Court of Appeal had another idea.  It "asked the parties to address whether the judgment was appealable, and, if not, whether we could review the judgment by treating Kaiser's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate."  Though the parties may have disagreed about Medicare Act preemption and exhaustion issues, they were as one that the judgment was appealable, and if not, that it could be reviewed by writ. 

        However, the Court of Appeal had another idea.  It concluded "the issues are not reviewable, either by appeal or by writ."

        A judgment must be final to be reviewable, and the "partial final award here does not meet that standard."  So what about review by writ?  Because the award did not "include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy" (section 1283.4), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award in the first place.  Therefore, because the "award" was not an award, it could not be reviewed by way of writ.

        The case could be viewed as an example of the principle that parties cannot by agreement create jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal where jurisdiction does not otherwise exist.

Bronze and Silver Oak Leaf Clusters.  Wikipedia.

1_{Judge of the LA Sup. Ct. sitting by designation.}